Video: Behind the Shield: Real-World Stories of Thwarted Ransomware Attacks | Duration: 2708s | Summary: Behind the Shield: Real-World Stories of Thwarted Ransomware Attacks | Chapters: Introduction to Ransomware (26.43s), Social Engineering Tactics (154.10501s), Email Bombing Detection (367.685s), Encryption Rates Decline (502.54s), MSP Vulnerability Exploitation (679.89496s), Operational Security Challenges (956.35004s), MFA's Critical Role (1037.77s), Ransomware Recovery Trends (1120.02s), Faster Ransomware Recovery (1164.395s), MDR Benefits Explored (1322.5951s), Conclusion and Insights (1751.415s)
Transcript for "Behind the Shield: Real-World Stories of Thwarted Ransomware Attacks": This Sophos webcast where we will be discussing everyone's favorite topic, how to stop ransomware. My name is John Shire. I'm a field CISO here at Sophos, and I'll be taking you through some good news stories for a change. Well, maybe it's not all good news, but at least there were some good outcomes. In cybersecurity, we often focus on bad outcomes, but I also think we need to celebrate our wins. So today, with the help of my panelists, we will take you through some examples of attacks that, if it weren't for the amazing folks in our managed detection and response organization, would have likely turned out much worse. We will also cover some highlights from the latest State of Ransomware Report. I'm joined today by Anthony Bradshaw, manager of incident response for MDR, and Sally Adam, VP of Solutions Marketing. Welcome both of you. I just hate your titles, but can you each give us a quick thirty second description of the expertise that you're bringing to the table for this discussion starting with Sally? Hi. Thanks, John. So, yes, for the last six years, I've run our state of ransomware research program where we've conducted extensive global research in a vendor agnostic style into the impacts and and causes of ransomware on organizations around the globe. Anthony? Yeah. Thanks, John. I've been at Sophos for a little over four years, and I lead our incident response team. So our team is the team that gets into customer's environments whenever, the the SOC escalates the cases to, to our team whenever there's critical severity incidents, and that's when we, engage. Alright. Yeah. That's really important, isn't it? So thanks for that. So let's dig into it, shall we? So the first set of cases I want to look at are there was that involve email bombing and voice phishing. And as of May 2025, Sophos MDR observed, at least 55 attempted attacks using these two techniques. Anthony, before we get into the details of some of these attacks, can you give us a brief description of what exactly is email bombing and voice phishing? Absolutely, John. So the number of attacks we're seeing utilizing this technique is certainly increasing. Email bombing and voice phishing or vishing are two types of social engineering attacks where threat actors target the human element of the security chain. When we look at email bombing specifically, it's a type of attack where a threat actor floods a user's email inbox with a large volume of messages and a short period of time. The idea is that they're overwhelming the user and making it difficult to distinguish between what's real and what's malicious. It can certainly be a lot to deal with as an end user. And so then when we look at vishing or voice phishing, it is the type of attack where threat actors utilize phone calls to trick users into revealing sensitive information or, in our cases that we've experienced, give them access to their devices. A threat actor will call a user over something like Microsoft Teams. The contact info may some say something familiar or look official like Jane from IT support. And for your average user, they may think this is a legitimate IT representative, not question it, and go through with what the threat actor is asking them to do. Yeah. So a bit of a one two punch there. And, Sally, in your report, you dug into some of the human impacts of ransomware. And I saw that over forty percent of the respondents experienced increased anxiety following a ransomware attack. It kinda strikes me that something like email bombing and voice phishing specifically would be the the the kinds of attacks that would really have an impact on the individuals who are being targeted. Can you tell us a bit more about how the people are experiencing attacks and how they're doing? Yeah. Absolutely. So this year's state of ransomware report reveals the experiences of 3,400 organizations around the globe that were hit by ransomware in the last year. And one one of the areas that it shines light on is the reper repercussions of an attack and and in in particular, having data encrypted on the IT team, on the cybersecurity team. And you can see that here in in this chart, the the impacts on the team. But exactly as you say, you know, increased anxiety, stress about future attacks is something that forty one percent of respondents have experienced. But there's lots of other impacts as well. Forty percent said they experienced increased pressure from senior leaders, and more than a third say they feel guilty about not stopping that attack. But going back to the the type of attack that Anthony was just talking to, when we look at the attacks that start with some form of phishing, whether that's, email phishing, voice phishing, and you can see these numbers added in on the on the left here, we can see the the human impact. So over half, fifty one percent of the the respondents when the attack started with phishing, so they have had increased anxiety or or stress, and and a similar number say they've had increased workload. And almost half, forty seven percent say they've had increased pressure from senior leaders. So as you can see, you know, all ransomware attacks have impacts on the the IT team, but phishing dials it up a a notch further. Yeah. It's it's one of those things I think that gets lost in a lot of the statistics out there is that human impact. So getting back to those cases, both sets of attackers used email bombing and voice phishing to gain initial access into the victim's network. Once inside, they deployed a bunch of different tools, including legitimate tools like Microsoft Quick Assist. What was it about these attacks that caused the MDR analyst to jump into action? Yeah. So when we look at the email bombing and vishing incidents we responded to, they have little variance in how we detected the activity, which is a good thing as that shows our detection logic has a wide coverage. In the main incident, we've, researched on the initial suspicious activity was detected detected when the threat actor began enumerating the environment. About five minutes after an employee of the company accepted an external teams call from the actor, they convinced the user to start a Microsoft quick assist session where the threat actor then opened command prompt and executed, a command known as NL test DC list, which allowed them to identify domain controllers in the environment. This is a common tactic that threat actors do early on to understand, what's going on. Right? And so while this isn't inherently malicious, it's suspicious enough that you want to get eyes on it pretty quickly. And so, this command executed, this command execution generated an NDR case, which notified us, the NDR team, that something suspicious was happening. And while while our analysts were triaging the case, the actor continued acting on objectives and began looking for a way to establish persistence on the device. They installed an open SSH binary that they didn't utilize as a backdoor to SSH into the device, and then this was also detected by Sophos and alerted our MDR analyst. So listening to you talking about these things, I it it it brings to mind one of the obvious protection mechanisms, which is something like application control. Because, you know, you mentioned a bunch of different binaries, Microsoft binaries as well, things like OpenSSH. So so if if if organizations out there are looking to protect against some of these attacks, it might be worth your while looking into something like application control so you can choose the one tool that you wanna allow and then block everything else. In one of the attacks, Sally, the criminals attempted to deploy black bastards ransomware, so the ones that Anthony was just talking about, and this was blocked by CryptoGuard. And your report shows that data encryption is at its lowest level in six years. This sounds like a really positive finding. What what do you think is behind this? Yeah. You're you're absolutely right. You know, this year's report revealed data encryption rates were at an all time low as as you can see in this chart. 50% of attacks, resulted in data encryption. That's that purple bar over on the the right. 44% of respondents say the attack was stopped before encryption could take place, and you can see that there. That's the the the middle green bar. So this is encouraging. You know, that downward trend on the purple bar is is very positive. It's what we want to see. And it it very much suggests that organizations are putting in place the the capabilities they need to stop attacks before they can be completed, such as doing twenty four seven threat detection and response to identify and stop adversary activities quickly. And it also can include putting in place, anti ransomware technologies like the Cryptregard capability and support endpoint that we were just mentioning that detects and rolls back malicious encryption. Now I just mentioned twenty four seven threat detection and response. There's lots of ways that organizations can implement this. They can do it in house using XDR or extended detection response tools. They can outsource to an MDR service or do a combination of the two. You know, for example, using their in house team during standard working hours and then pass to an MDR service for off hours. So options there. But whilst we're on this chart, there is one more thing that I want to point out, which is the small but actually quite noticeable increase in attacks where data was not encrypted, but the organization was held to ransom anyway. That's the the blue bar on the chart, and it increased from 3% in the last two years to 6% in this year's report. And it really suggests to me that as organizations are getting better at stopping the data encryption, adversaries are turning ever more to data exfiltration and extortion to monetize their attacks even if they can't encrypt the files. And what this means is that it's increasingly important to stop those attacks early before the adversaries can get to the data. And and, of course, just a final comment here. You know, this isn't game over. 50 is a very welcome drop from from last year, from the year before, but it's still one in two attacks that are resulting in data adversaries who are gonna keep evolving their attacks. Yeah. It speaks that that speaks about layers to me. So you wanna have different layers of prevention, obviously, and then you want to be detecting early so that you can respond early. But, yeah, as far as stopping attacks, great. But then you also have to detect when an actor's in the network and doing something else. So those layers are really important. So let me let's have a look at another attack that the MBR team successfully thwarted. This time, the attackers took advantage of a chain of vulnerabilities in an MSP, a managed service provider's remote management tool, or are often called RNNs. What what happened here? Yeah. So when we look at this one, you know, compared to the previous attacks that we've talked about, this one is a little less sophisticated, but it had a much higher impact. This is also a current trend we're seeing known as a one to many attack where threat actors are targeting MSPs remote monitoring and management tools or RMM, excuse me, to gain access to the MSPs downstream clients. For those not familiar, RMMs are a mission critical tool for IT administrators and MSPs who manage their their clients' environments remotely. Without them, they're, you know, likely not accessing the environment or using more outdated, less secure options such as basic RDP over the Internet. But when we look at this particular attack, in January, SIPL Health disclosed multiple vulnerabilities that were affecting their RMM product with patches to remediate. There were three specifically that we believe were chained together to gain initial access to the RMM, and so these were all released in 2024. You know, first being 57727, 57728, and then 57726. A few months after the vulnerabilities were announced, MDR responded to an incident where threat actors gained access to the MSP's simple help server and attempted to deploy DragonForce ransomware against the MSP and then their downstream clients. Right? So remember, the one to many attack. And so when we look at our specific customer, MDR was alerted to a suspicious installation of a Simple Health installer file. And so the installer was pushed via a legitimate Simple Health RMM instance hosted by the client's MSP. After installing their own instance of Simple Help for persistence, the attacker utilized WMIC to enumerate the environment by collecting, you know, things like device names and configuration settings, users, and network connections. So, again, that early enumeration that threat actors, often like to conduct. Seeing as it as this was not inherently malicious at the time, the MDR analyst escalated this to the client for their review. And so then when we go over the next couple days, the threat actor returned to the environment and they installed AnyDesk, an additional persistent mechanism for them just in case their simple help access got revoked. And this is when it really started to ramp up, and they began their pre ransomware activities. So at this point, right, they've they've enumerated, they've got their persistence out there, and they're ramping up, and they start to leverage multiple TTPs to continue packing on their objectives, including elevating to a domain administrator account, downloading and executing batch scripts to clear logs, and they attempted to uninstall Sophos a variety of different ways, but they were all blocked due to tamper protection. And so this activity alerted the NDR team, and then we initiated incident response procedures to neutralize the threat. Fortunately for our client who was protected by NDR, we were able to contain and boot the threat actor from the environment before they were able to exploit or deploy any type of ransomware. However, like I said before, this was an MSP attack, so one to many. The MSP had clients that were not protected by Sophos, and they did experience successful encryption. Yeah. These one of many attacks, I think, you know, there there are versions of this and supply chain attacks. They're they're a way for criminals to obviously try to maximize their impact. Right? And WMIC, for those out there, WMIC, so the Windows Management Instrumentation Council, I think it stands for. It's another one of those tools that is a living off the land binary. Right? It's something that's on the operating system that the bad guys are using, because it's got elevated privileges. It's signed by Microsoft. It's a legitimate application. So those are the kinds of things I think when you're looking at, you know, doing detection engineering and and trying to find that signal in the noise, you might wanna look a little closer at some of these tools. So for the third year running, exploited vulnerabilities were the top root cause of attacks. Besides vulnerabilities, what else are organizations struggling with that is contributing to these ransomware attacks as, as was found in your in your survey, Sally? Yeah, John. There's a couple of ways we can look at this. And the first is is very much those technical root cause of attacks. As you can see here in this chart, explosive vulnerabilities over on the right hand side, such as the ones Anthony was just talking about for Simple Help. They've been the top reported root cause by victims for the last three years. But, you know, compromised credentials, they're also a major issue where adversaries are exploiting the credentials of legitimate users to breach an organization. And we see malicious emails and and phishing that we were talking about before, that's continuing to be a major vector too. So this is, of course, one way of looking at those technical root causes. But another lens that we can look through when we're thinking about, okay, why organizations falling victim to ransomware is the more operational factors, that are at play. And this is what we can see here. You know, we have a high level of respondents, 63. They said there were protection issues that contributed to them falling victim. Either they lacked protection or the the protection wasn't good enough. It it didn't defend them effectively in the event of the attack. You know, and a similar percentage said they had a a lack of people, which contributed to them being hit. Now this could have been a a lack of expertise, the specific skills needed to to do the the things that Anthony was just talking about, but it can also be a lack of capacity. There's simply not enough, people to cover the twenty four seven nature of security operations. And then there's a third challenge. We have security gaps, both known and unknown exposures. So there's a whole load of, things going on. In fact, organizations on average cited 2.7 operational factors that contributed to them falling victim. So really emphasizing, making clear that that they're facing challenges on multiple fronts. A lot to juggle. Yeah. Nobody said security was easy. Right? So speaking of compromised credentials, because it seems like compromised credentials exploiting vulnerabilities are perennially at the top of a lot of lists here. Another case comes to mind where the fog group was stopped in their tracks, but only after they successfully use compromised VPN credentials to get in. And it looks like MFA wasn't enabled. So, Anthony, how much difference can something like MFA make in your overall security posture? Yeah. Exactly, John. That's that's spot on. And so for these incidents, we had multiple groups targeting sonic wall firewalls to gain access using credentials that had no MFA enablement. And, you know, it's it's well known that criminals take the path of least resistance. If you broadcast to your neighbors, colleagues, friends, delivery driver, and everyone else that you leave your front door, back door, windows, and any other points of entry to your house unlocked, you've now increased your odds of being that path of least resistance. Putting remote access devices on the Internet like VPNs with no additional security mechanisms such as just basic MFA is the same thing. Threat actors can easily target those accounts and brute force them to gain access. MFA can be the difference between, you know, your end user getting compromised versus the bad guys going next to the next neighborhood over where they know they leave those doors unlocked. Yeah. I just you say that. I just saw a video on my local town subreddit of of people posting their, you know, their Ring camera or whatever, Nest camera footage of somebody just going around trying car doors at night. Right? And and criminals are no different. They'll they'll, you know, do a scan and look for something vulnerable or an exposed RDP server. And on Irish people, if if you are gonna deploy multifactor authentication, you know, go with the best first. So go with something that's phishing resistant, if you can. Otherwise, you know, obviously, any MFA will will slow them down. And Fog along with Acura are ransomware as a service brands, and they made quite an impact last year. The state of ransomware report tells us that recovery times are getting faster. Why do you think that is, Sally? Yeah. Great comment. So, just, you know, supporting your point around recovery times getting faster, this chart that we've got here shows recovery times from ransomware attacks for actually the last four years. And as you can see, this year's study, the those two bars on the the right of each section, organizations are reporting recoveries getting quicker. You know, 16% fully recovered in a day, up from seven percent last year. Overall half are now fully recovered in a week. And this is, of course, really good news. But to your question, you know, why is this happening? I think there's a few things going on here. But but they essentially boil down to, you know, the more you do something, the faster and and better you get at it. So at an organizational level, this means having better recovery readiness. Organizations are putting in place that they're practicing instant response plans so they know what to do if an attack does strike. Similarly, we're seeing organizations being quicker to put in those expert incident responders to help if they get hit, which speeds up recovery, lowers impact. And then the third factor is that ransomware recovery has unfortunately become more like a regular business. There's insurance companies, legal firms, breach advisers. They're all available ready to act quickly if needed. So, they're all getting more experienced, more prepared, more, practiced in ransomware recovery, and it's it's contributing to the the faster recovery times. Yeah. And it seems to me that there's some correlation here with the cost of recovery. So the report indicated the cost of recovery excluding any of the ransom paid are actually going down. So do you think there's a correlation here? Yeah. Absolutely. And and in fact, we saw a couple of big drops in the financial aspects of ransomware in the last year. The median ransom payment fell from $2,000,000 to $1,000,000,000, so very welcome reduction there. And the average recovery cost excluding those ransoms dropped 44 percent, down from 2,730,000 reported in our report last year to 1,530,000 reported this year. So you can see this on on the screen. But I think there's definitely a correlation between faster recovery and lower costs because one of the biggest costs in dealing with ransomware is business interruption. So the less interruption you have, the lower the financial impact. And that's why bringing an expert instant responders quickly makes good business sense as well as good security sense. Now saying all that, you know, 1 and a half million dollars is a pretty huge hole in pretty much every organization's budget. So we're not in a good place, but we're in a much better place than we were last year. Yeah. I'd I'd say again, you know, that's welcome news. Right? So if you're recovering faster, great. And if you're not having to pay as much money to to do that recovery, then I think that's awesome as well. And so going back to the case the Akira case, when I was looking at the case notes for this attack, I noticed that the the host name of the attacking machine was Kali. And for those unfamiliar, Kali Linux is a very popular penetration testing, Linux distribution. And I'm always looking for ways that companies can use their existing telemetry, and I think a detection for the host name, Cali, could be one of them. Can you give us some examples, Anthony, of of ways that organizations can accelerate their response times? Yeah. Like you mentioned, Cali is super popular Linux distro that the good and bad guys leverage. And so, sure, an easy alert mechanism could be to detect on the host name, but you would want to be careful with something like that to not cause yourself alert fatigue. You want to ensure that your alerts that you're responding to are a legitimate and provide good contextual information, whether it's your in house security team reviewing or an MDR provider like our team. And so how do you accelerate response times? You need to have smart, efficient detection mechanisms and also someone that knows what to do with those detections. You know, security is not a Monday through Friday, eight to five thing. It's twenty four seven by three sixty five and requires a multi layered approach to execute correctly. Not only is it difficult to find skilled cybersecurity analysts to interpret and respond to those detections, but it's also costly. And so that's why MDR is a great choice to help meet that requirement. MDR can accelerate those response times dramatically. Yeah. Then while you you talk about alert fatigue, right, that that 63% of, lack of people that Sally was mentioning earlier is, I think is really indicative of that. And, I I I always like to say that security isn't a, like, as you said, an eight to five thing, security is a lifestyle. Right? You gotta do that constantly, not only in your professional life, but also in your personal life as well. 38% of the respondents in this year's survey indicated that the operational root cause of a ransomware attack was a known security gap that was not addressed. What are some of the ways that organizations can mitigate against this finding? What what do you think is happening here, and then how can they mitigate against it, Sally? Yeah. That's a great question because known security gaps are a massive issue for organizations, and these can include unpatched vulnerabilities, such as the the case we were looking at before. But it can also be open RDP ports, assets exposed to the to the Internet, other security weaknesses. So knowing you have exposures is is a good first step. But even when you do, addressing them isn't always easy. You know, the first challenge for for many organizations is is where should I focus? You know, what should I focus on fixing first? And, you know, I had a look up this week, you know, how many CDs were published last year. It's surprising it was actually over 40,000. So when you've got 40,000 plus CVEs published in a single year, knowing where to start, which of the priority ones could be can be challenging. And then sort of leading to what Anthony was just talking about, having the time and the expertise to fix them, knowing what to do when you've realized you've got an exposure and that it's important is also difficult. Now in terms of mitigating this, this is where a managed risk service can can really help. And it can help with, both the identifying, the the priority, exposures to address and then how to actually go about doing it. So with the with the managed risk service, you use a combination of advanced AI models and human expertise to identify the most important, the most pressing exposures to address so you can fix them in priority order and also get guidance on how to go about it. So, yeah, really can can help reduce exposure, reduce, reduce operational risk in that way. Yeah. I'm gonna double down on that. I think managed risk really helps a lot of our customers identify not only where some of the gaps are. So we're gonna look at your external attack surface and say, alright. Here's here's what you're exposing to the Internet, including things you didn't know about, which is really important. But also prioritize them saying, we know that, you know, the CVE is out there, this vulnerability is out there, and it's actively being exploited. So we'll pop that to the top of the list and and help, hopefully, help make, in some of these triaging decisions a lot easier for you. And, out of that, you know, you you mentioned experts. So I'm a big believer in using experts to solve certain problems. For example, I'm I'm really not about to start doing my own dental surgery. And at the risk of sounding bias, and you touched on this a little bit, Anthony, earlier, but what do you think is the biggest benefit to organizations? What what benefit do they derive from using something like an MDR service? Yeah. You know, I think anyone who's been born in the last six years have experienced a global pandemic. Right? And so when we look at pre COVID, I I might have had a different response to this question. Just because NDR was in its early stages, provide the providers vary greatly in what they offered. And now five years later, we have a handful of NDR providers that are at the top, mature and setting the standard including Sophos. And we also have way more companies having the remote work first, as their as their their culture. Right? So they're putting things on the Internet. They've got employees at home working. And so it's important that you secure, your infrastructure. And so for us, it's not just the MDR service that customer benefits from, it's the access to the entire Sophos ecosystem and the opportunity to leverage our wide portfolio of services and products to meet meet that multilayered security approach that we all know and love. And so when you buy NDR from Sophos, you're getting our world class threat intelligence from Sophos Labs and our counter threat unit. You get twenty four seven by three sixty five coverage from the MDR team and and much more. Years and years of industry experience, expertise, and response, all through just an MDR subscription alone. You know, trying to implement just one of those things, whether it be a threat intelligence capability or, somebody that can constantly create detections, somebody that can do incident response, you know, somebody that can help, you know, give you consultation on certain things. Like, all of those can be quite costly and resource intensive. Yeah. I I when I think back about the differences between, let's say, like, IR, bespoke IR where you're reactive to something versus MDR, some Some of the things that stand out to me is that with MDR, there's also more telemetry to act on, and the the bad guys aren't able to hide as much, which is which is really important. So, yeah, I think that that's that's one of the benefits. And then also, there's a community aspect to it where when we detect something, possibly something novel or a new technique in one customer, we can actually feed that back into the system so that there's now a detection ready for potentially the next use of that technique or that tool, and so everybody else benefits from it. So finally, Sally, reflecting on this year's report, what do you think we can take away from the findings? Well, actually, encouragingly, there are a lot of positives. We've got a lower data encryption rate, lower ransom demands, lower ransom payments, faster recovery. You know, it's clear that businesses are taking ransomware much more seriously. They're actively taking steps to to mitigate the impact, and and it's paying off. So so, you know, really well done to to everyone there. Of course, it's not all well done. We're seeing that the use of backups to restore encrypted data is at the lowest level in six years. Now paying the ransom may sometimes be an easier option, but you're just putting money in a criminal's network, and you're giving them reasons to continue with their attacks. So, really, the biggest takeaways for me are, to look at the technical and operational factors that are leaving organizing exposed to attacks and and prioritize addressing them. And, you know, we have this opportunity to stop the attackers from penetrating organizations in the first place, and we can use these experiences of 3,400 organizations to to help guide a ransomware risk reduction strategy. So, yeah, lots of positives, but some some directions as to where we can further elevate defenses. Yeah. Well said. And and I think that backup statistic is, well, it's a bit shocking. It it speaking of guiding your strategy, criminals are going after the backups. The reason that maybe some of them aren't using them is because they're not available. So if you can figure out a way to make sure that your backups are offline and not available to cyber criminals, you can help us with that stat as well. So there's always so much to learn about attacks and how we can help mitigate against them and little strategies here and there to to protect your organization. We can't cover it all. So if you want more information on how attacks unfold, the types of tools and techniques that the criminals are using, you know, head on over to news.Sophos.com. I'd like to thank the panel because I think there was some great insights today, and they gave us some much needed positivity. Sure. There were some attacks sprinkled in there, but I think the outcomes were much better than they would have been had these organizations not been prepared to respond. I encourage everyone to head over to Sophos.com/ransomware2025 to read this year's state of ransomware report. It's packed with even more statistics and insights that can, you know, guide that defender journey. And for more information about how MDR can help you defeat cyber attacks, go to Sophos.com/mdr. That's all from us today. Until next time, stay secure.